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ABSTRACT 
One does not need to be an expert in housing to be concerned about the severity of the current 
housing crisis in London. An overwhelming majority of the city’s population face the 
predicament of deteriorating housing affordability. Median house prices are now more than ten 
times median incomes, additions to the stock are insufficient, and prices are volatile. 
In the search for remedies, well-intended solutions emerging from fragmented analyses of the 
problem inevitably lead to unintended consequences. The incapacity of the human mind to 
correctly infer the behaviour of complex systems presents a case for System Dynamics. 
This paper, the result of the first year of a PhD, describes the underlying socio-economic 
structure responsible for the Housing crisis in London. We have built a causal loop diagram of 
London’s housing situation which demonstrates how the interlocking of numerous reinforcing 
feedback loops have contributed to the house price inflation, and how the potential for a future 
crash is essentially built into the system. We contend that this type of conceptualisation can 
help prevent the typical ‘blame game’ going on in various circles, and focus resources on 
overhauling the broken system via designing and implementing a concerted package of 
transformative policies.   
                                                          
1 This work is the result of the first year of a PhD. Kaveh Dianati is the PhD student. Nicole Zimmermann and 
Michael Davies are his supervisors. 
1. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Over the past 40 years, real house prices – but not real incomes – have grown faster in the UK 
than in any other OECD country (Figure 1). As a consequence, a genuine ‘housing affordability 
crisis’ (henceforth Housing Crisis) has been developing, which is particularly severe in the 
Greater London Area (Hilber, 2015; Hilber & Vermeulen, 2016). Median house prices are now 
ten to sixteen times medium incomes in London, the worst affordability level since data became 
available ( 
Figure 2) (Hilber, 2015). 
 
Figure 1 - Annual average change in real house prices in OECD Countries (1970 - 2013). Borrowed from 
Edwards (2015) 
 
Figure 2 - Affordability in London and in England (1997-2015). Source DCLG LiveTable 577 
There is some debate about the extent to which the government’s policies are driving the 
apparent development of a new housing bubble in London and the Southeast (Smyth, 2015). 
England 
Also, there are clear gaps in understanding relating to the under-supply of housing in response 
to rising house prices (Figure 3) (Harris, 2003). 
 
Figure 3 - UK housing supply and house prices. Borrowed from Gallent (2015) 
The very high rents and housing costs being extracted from workers constitute a great burden 
on the productive economy and its competitiveness, particularly in London and the South East 
(Edwards, 2015; KPMG and Shelter, 2015, p. 47). The UK’s housing system has grown into 
an engine of growing inequality, concentrating wealth in the hands of landowners, landlords 
and established owner-occupiers (and the lawyers, surveyors, developers and financial 
institutions integral to the process), at the expense of tenants, new buyers and the growing 
numbers rendered homeless (Edwards, 2016). The increasingly inequitable distribution of 
housing in Britain should be an important cause for concern (Dorling, 2015). 
The UK housing market is also highly volatile, especially compared to its European 
counterparts (Montgomerie & Büdenbender, 2015). House price volatility may lead to 
volatility of consumption and reduced macro-economic stability (Hilber & Vermeulen, 2016). 
Besides prices, private house building is also cyclical, having shown three major ‘boom-and-
bust’ cycles since WWII, and with each cycle total output has ratcheted steadily down, as seen 
in the three distinct cycles highlighted in Figure 4 (KPMG and Shelter, 2015, p. 5).  
Edwards (2015, p. 24) justifies calling the situation a ‘crisis’ “because it is so threatening to 
the health, stability and cohesion of the society – to ‘sustainability’ if you like that term”, as 
well as the economy (Edwards, 2015). Echoing Danny Dorling’s (2014) recent book , housing 
is the defining issue of our times. 
 
  
Figure 4 - Private sector house building England 1946 -2013. Borrowed from KPMG and Shelter (2015) 
Movements in London house prices have tended to exceed and anticipate those across the rest 
of the UK (Harris, 2003). There has been much discussion of a specific ripple effect on house 
prices through the country with London as the epicentre (Harris, 2003). Furthermore, McKee 
et al. (2016) assert that there is no such thing as a ‘UK experience’ in the housing field, 
spatial variations being increasingly important (Edwards, 2015). However, little research has 
focused on London’s housing in particular, and on why housing prices in London have grown 
so much faster than the rest of the UK in recent years ( 
Figure 2). For these reasons, as well as the salience of London in England’s economy, we chose 
to focus on London in this research, rather than England or the UK as a whole. 
Our current understanding of London’s Housing crisis remains fragmented and qualitative. 
Most studies look at the issue through a narrow lens, and those which attempt to take a more 
integrated approach draw conclusions based on ‘mental simulation’, whilst it has been 
established that the human mind cannot be trusted with inferring the behaviours of complex 
systems with multiple feedback loops. This gap in the research motivates our choice of topic 
and methodology. 
The next section presents a summary of the literature deemed most relevant to the causes and 
structure surrounding London’s housing. Section 3 builds a dynamic hypothesis formulated 
based on the literature, to be used in the remainder of this PhD research as the basis of a formal 
quantitative System Dynamics model. Finally, Section 4 discusses some initial implications of 
taking a systems thinking viewpoint towards the Crisis.  
2. SUMMARY OF LITERATURE 
Most commentators, including economist Kate Barker (2006), in her authoritative studies 
commissioned by the Bank of England, see the housing crisis as a crisis of shortage in supply. 
Belief in a shortage of supply is generally grounded in comparing current and projected yearly 
numbers for household formations which exceeds the annual supply of new housing. The idea 
of a supply shortage being at the root of the housing crisis is further cemented by the fact that 
the supply of new housing has been declining since the 1970s (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 - Dwellings completed by tenure 1950-2015, UK. Source: DCLG LiveTable 241 
More recently, however, a different discourse has been emerging, majorly led by Dorling 
(2014), which frames the housing crisis as a crisis of unequal distribution of housing, putting 
forth the idea that if housing space were equally distributed, Londoners would all be 
sufficiently housed. Gallent (2015) relates this unequal distribution to the over-reliance on 
allocation by an inflated market fuelled by over-investment. Edwards (2016) acknowledges the 
idea of unequal distribution as valuable insight, but believes that it is “scarcely the basis for a 
plan of immediate action or a quick fix since the inequalities involved are so deeply embedded. 
The use of royal palaces for homeless families is not in early prospect”(Edwards, 2016, p. 29). 
Among the still dominant discourse that sees the shortage in supply at the epicentre of the 
problem, a prevailing stream of literature, championed by Hilber (2015) among others, blames 
the failure of planning in releasing sufficient parcels of land quickly enough as the root cause 
for the shortage in supply. This view is also taken by many in the housebuilding industry 
(White, 1986). Planners, however, firmly reject this assertion by claiming that in fact far more 
land is released than is actually being developed, pointing towards the notion of speculative 
land banking (White, 1986). 
It is considered a wise business strategy to hold a stock of permissioned land as buffer against 
spikes in demand. Often, however, developers also engage in ‘strategic land banking’, i.e. 
speculation in the land market. It has been suggested that, often, this practice can amount to 
hoarding. It is difficult, however, to prove or disprove this claim, as the land market in the UK 
is known to be highly opaque, absent a comprehensive ‘cadastre’ that registers land holding, 
transaction, etc. (Edwards, 2015). Nevertheless, it should be alarming that some estimates 
suggest that up to 45% of ‘stalled’ sites’ in London are held by non-development firms (KPMG 
and Shelter, 2015, p. 58), who never intend to build new housing, but aim to reap windfall 
gains by engaging in speculative trading of land. 
In investigating the causes for the housing shortage, KMPG & Shelter (2015) has drawn 
attention towards increasing consolidation in the housebuilding industry, signalling an 
increasingly less competitive environment. Competitive pressures are strong upstream for 
securing access to land, which is a major determinant of a firm’s market share, but they are 
significantly reduced further downstream in the building market. Besides ramifications for 
standards and quality of new build accommodations, reduced competitive pressure on each 
building site also leaves the rate of building and releasing housing units at the discretion of 
developers, who tend to seek to maximise profit margins, as opposed to output volume (Adams, 
Leishman, & Moore, 2009). This is thought to put upward pressure on house prices. 
In studies of the underlying causes of the Housing Crisis, less attention has been directed to the 
demand side of the picture. Moreover, where demand is mentioned, discussion tends to revolve 
around the growing number of households, both as a result of population growth and due to the 
households’ shrinking size (KPMG and Shelter, 2015, p. 19). Gallent (2015), on the other hand, 
draws attention to the unappreciated role of inflationary growth in investment demand, both 
domestic and international, in pushing prices farther and farther beyond the means of would-
be first-time buyers. May (2015) noted that in the ten year period between 2001 and 2011, 1.9 
million new homes were built in England, while the number of new owner occupiers increased 
by only 22,000. In the same ten year period, 2.1 million new buy-to-let owners entered this 
profitable investment market. 
Ironically, almost all government policies targeted towards mitigating the crisis are adding fuel 
to the fire by feeding demand. For instance, the recent Help to Buy scheme aimed to ‘boost 
housing supply’ via stimulating demand through an equity loan scheme for first-time buyers, 
and a mortgage guarantee scheme which applies to existing housing (Archer & Cole, 2014; 
Hilber, 2015). Help to Buy has been almost unanimously criticised for contributing to the rise 
in prices (Edwards, 2016; Hilber, 2015), and denounced by the harshest critiques as ‘homes for 
votes’ or ‘help to bubble’ (Dorling, 2015). Another important policy which essentially 
promotes housing as an investment vehicle is Housing Benefits for those unable to afford their 
rents, which has been said to be effectively subsidising windfall gains for landlords (Edwards, 
2015). 
Rising rents are threatening the viability of economic firms in London, by raising the bar on 
wages that employers must offer in order to attract necessary labour (KPMG and Shelter, 2015, 
p. 47). In addition, rents eat into household savings (Shelter, 2013), reducing available funds 
for investment in productive sectors of the economy. On top of that, whatever funds available 
tend to be poured mostly into the inflated housing market, further depriving non-housing firms 
of investment (Gallent, 2015). This trend makes the economy reliant to a large extent on rising 
house prices, and makes it vulnerable to the inherent volatility of housing markets. This 
concern is in line with Forrester’s thesis in Urban Dynamics, which states that a city’s 
economic vitality depends on a healthy ratio of housing to businesses (Forrester, 1969, p. 118).  
Montgomerie and Büdenbender (2015), in an incisive critique of the UK’s housing-based 
welfare strategies, argue that the financialisation of housing in the UK is a unique set of 
political and economic circumstances that cannot be repeated, and therefore, current gains from 
residential housing are a one-off wealth windfall to particular (lucky) groups within society. 
The temporal and spatial limits of gains from residential housing mean that the same conditions 
cannot be repeated (often enough) in the way required for residential housing to provide a 
generalizable welfare function. Moreover, housing-based welfare has created new 
intergenerational inequalities and an enormous debt overhang that continues to plague the 
British economy (Montgomerie & Büdenbender, 2015). 
Making residential housing an asset-class simply means housing-based welfare strategies 
reinforce existing wealth inequalities because house price inflation will concentrate wealth 
gains at the top end of the distribution and serve to make housing more unaffordable for those 
lower down the distribution. The problem of asset-based welfare is that it depends on a 
continuous upward trajectory of house prices and, in doing so, simply reinforces existing social 
inequalities. The temporal, spatial and social constraints present in the UK housing market 
suggest that relying on homeownership as a form of asset-based welfare does not work as a 
mechanism for transmitting wealth gains to households in order to provide financial security 
(Montgomerie & Büdenbender, 2015). 
In summary, although the literature on London’s/UK’s housing crisis tends to be fragmented, 
it is rife with causal insights into the underlying structure responsible for the Crisis. Having 
defined the dynamic problem, the next step in this research is to put together the ‘pieces of the 
puzzle’ derived from the literature into an integrated, feedback-rich framework. This is the 
focus of the following section, which describes our dynamic hypothesis of the problem. 
3. DYNAMIC HYPOTHESIS 
In this section, we will describe a dynamic hypothesis that attempts to integrate several of the 
various hypotheses underlying the Housing Crisis, according to the literature. 
This integrated ‘theory’ of the housing crisis starts in Figure 6. As house prices go up, return 
on housing investment rises, leading to an increase in investment demand. This heightened 
demand puts further upward pressure on house prices (Gallent, 2015), closing the first 
reinforcing feedback loop of the diagram (housing as investment loop). An increase in 
investment demand incites more speculative behaviour, which is known to lead to market 
volatility (Eskinasi, 2014, p. 54). This unpredictability of the market has led to a prevalent 
aversion to risk within the housebuilding industry, which tends to restrict housing output 
(Payne, 2016, p. 4), putting another upwards pressure on house prices. Market volatility also 
encourages accumulating larger land banks as buffer (KPMG and Shelter, 2015, p. 37). 
Speculative behaviour within the housing market stimulates speculation within the land market, 
and thus further land banking (KPMG and Shelter, 2015, p. 32). This works hand in hand with 
the general risk aversion within the housebuilding industry to further limit the supply of new 
housing. 
 
Figure 6 - London's housing crisis CLD, over-investment, market volatility, and land banking 
So far the investigated dynamics were supply-side loops. Figure 7 adds to this more 
mechanisms occurring on the demand side. The higher investment demand and the purchase of 
more and more houses as investment vehicles, builds up a larger and larger stock of investment 
housing that can be an ideal collateral for applying for more housing loans (Gallent, 2015, p. 
9). Higher return on housing investment also instigates an even higher availability of housing 
loans. This expanding possibility helps investment demand grow further. 
On the bottom-left corner of the diagram, higher house prices push up rents and higher rents 
push up house prices, coupling the two together in a tight and crippling union. The outrageous 
growth in house prices has priced out an increasingly larger proportion of the population out 
of the buying market and into the rent market, pushing up rents. Higher rents further improve 
return on housing investment and further stimulate investment demand.  
 
Figure 7 - London's housing crisis CLD, credit and price-rent loops added 
Back to the supply side, land prices are also very tightly linked to house prices (Figure 8). 
From the estimated selling prices of houses to be built on a particular site, the costs of 
production and the profit margin are deducted, giving the ceiling price that the builder would 
pay for land (KPMG and Shelter, 2015, p. 34; White, 1986), making land prices dependent on 
house prices. This process is known as ‘residual land pricing’. As the single most costly input 
to housebuilding, house prices are also majorly influenced by land prices. 
Planning authorities in the UK tend to release land in large parcels. This, together with rising 
prices of land, increasingly drives smaller developers out of business, leading to industry 
consolidation. Market volatility is also known to be a driver of consolidation in the 
housebuilding industry. Larger developers are better-resourced and more prone to engage in 
strategic land banking (White, 1986, p. 108), aggravating supply constraints and house price 
inflation. 
 
Figure 8 – London’s housing crisis CLD, consolidation loop added 
The feedback loops that emerge from the description above are all reinforcing loops. The 
hypothesis is that all these reinforcing mechanisms have formed a self-accelerating engine of 
growth, with soaring house prices and investment demand at its centre; a formidable machine 
that seems to have a ‘will’ of its own. In the absence of stabilising forces, such mechanisms 
tend to generate exponential growth (as seen in house prices, e.g. Figure 3). Of course, in the 
real-world, there are always counteracting forces and balancing loops that hold growth 
processes in check, and eventually bring growth to a halt. A couple of such balancing forces 
are added to the CLD in Figure 9. An increase in rents increases the cost of doing business for 
London businesses both directly, and indirectly, through putting an upward pressure on wages. 
Moreover, in an example of the ‘success-to-the-successful’ archetype, the success of the 
housing sector has increasingly deprived productive sectors of the economy of much needed 
loans. A scenario can be envisioned where, as a result of increasing rents as well as decreasing 
availability of bank loans, firm competitiveness in London would have declined to such an 
extent that the city’s economy would start to stagnate and perhaps decline. Employment would 
slow down, negatively impacting on households’ disposable income. The inflating burden of 
interest to be paid on housing loans brings disposable incomes further down. Demand for 
housing would stagnate and rents would stop growing. It is at that point where more and more 
landlords would face difficulty paying back their mortgages, both because of the economic 
slowdown and due to the subsequent slowdown in rents. Consequently, arrears and defaults on 
housing loans would pose a threat to the financial sector, making housing loans riskier and 
scarcer, which further brings down demand for housing. Any potential subsequent fall in prices 
could cause panic and over-reaction in the market, setting in motion every single one of the 
reinforcing loops described in the above diagram, this time in the opposite direction. In short, 
the ‘ball’ that had been so far rolling uphill would reach the peak and start rolling down while 
gaining potentially devastating speed, generating an ‘overshoot and collapse’ pattern of 
behaviour, also known as a ‘boom and bust’ in the context of housing markets. Similar 
dynamics have happened in the past, such as the one causing the global financial crisis towards 
the end of the past decade. In Sterman’s words (1986, p. 116), “in the extreme, the 
debt/deflation spiral can cause the collapse of the banking system and the economy. The greater 
the degree of speculation during the expansion, the more likely is a panic during the downturn”. 
The concern is that London’s housing context comprises all necessary ingredients for repeated 
boom and bust cycles, i.e. reinforcing mechanisms coupled with balancing loops involving 
delays, and that as seen historically, such dramatic boom and bust patterns are not only likely, 
they are in essence structurally embedded and almost inevitable. 
 
Figure 9 - London's Housing Crisis, full CLD including balancing loops 
4. DISCUSSION 
Looking at the housing crisis from the structural perspective described above seems to have a 
number of immediate implications. Firstly, in line with what several authors have pointed out 
(Edwards, 2015, 2016; Gallent, 2015; KPMG and Shelter, 2015), the Crisis does not have an 
‘easy’ solution and cannot be approached from one single angle. Any battle for improving the 
affordability of housing in London must inevitably be fought on a number of well-coordinated 
fronts. Secondly, despite researchers as well as actors within the system frequently engaging 
in a ‘blame game’, the Crisis does not appear to be the ‘fault’ of any single actor/entity, be it 
the planners, the builder, the landowners or the investors. All things considered, every single 
actor seems to be acting quite rationally within their own scope, at least from a short-term 
perspective. Rather, it is the ‘system’ that is broken (Gallent, 2015), and if the Crisis is to be 
tackled, it is the ‘system’ that needs to be re-designed. Lastly, as empirically demonstrated 
(Sterman, 1989), no human mind can correctly simulate the behaviour resulting from changes 
made to such a complex system, consisting of many feedback loops. That is the reason why the 
System Dynamics approach advocates formal quantitative modelling of qualitative hypotheses 
for rigorous analysis. 
Within the systems literature, one of the widely known systems archetypes is shifting the 
burden (Figure 10) (Senge, 1990, Appendix 2). This archetype describes a situation where a 
problem symptom appears, presenting the decision-maker with two possible courses of action: 
A ‘symptomatic’ solution which relieves the symptom temporarily, but does not address the 
underlying problem, and a fundamental solution that does address the underlying problem, but 
takes significantly more time and resources to implement. In this situation, it often happens 
that the decision-maker keeps applying the ‘symptomatic’ solution, which not only leaves the 
underlying problem unaddressed, but it also might exacerbate the problem due to potential 
long-term side-effects.  
 
Figure 10 - The 'Shifting the Burden' systems archetype. Borrowed from Senge (1990) 
A similar dynamic seems to be happening within London’s (and more generally the UK’s) 
housing context. House prices are rising outside the reach of more and more households, 
leaving them at the mercy of the private rented sector, with rising demand and rising rents. Part 
of the government’s solution to this is demand-side subsidies (Help to Buy in the sales market 
and Housing Benefit in the rent market) in order to keep house prices and rental costs affordable 
by insulating them from market forces (Archer & Cole, 2014). For some observers, “there is 
obvious irony in reacting to a demand-side housing crisis by feeding demand” (Gallent, 2015, 
p. 11). 
A continuation of the current government policies might lead either to an extreme inadequacy 
of rent subsidies, or a soaring benefit bill that would soon become an unbearable burden to the 
public purse. This ‘side effect’ (Figure 11) depletes resources that could have gone towards a 
more fundamental solution to the Crisis, such as for instance weaning the economy off its 
reliance on house price growth and towards investments in productive sectors. 
In addition, current public discourse seems to be dominated by a call for ‘making more 
affordable housing’ as a remedy to the dysfunctional market (Gallent, 2015). This can be seen 
as another ‘symptomatic’ solution being ardently implemented, while the more fundamental 
problem of ‘making housing more affordable’ seems to be painstakingly swept under the rug. 
As Gallent (2015) concludes, “there is no real will - at large or political - to change anything. 
Whenever responses to the ‘Housing Crisis’ are outlined, they are always piecemeal and 
restricted to what can be ‘realistically’ achieved in ‘this parliament’”. In the words of Christian 
Hilber (2015, p. 2), “substantive reforms could solve the Housing Crisis, but politicians of all 
stripes back away from such reforms out of fear of being demonised by the vested interests. 
Instead, proposed policies tend to tackle the symptoms – rather than the causes – of the UK’s 
Housing Crisis”. 
 Figure 11 - Shifting the Burden in the context of UK housing policy 
5. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
As mentioned earlier, this paper results from the first year’s work on a PhD, spent on reviewing 
the literature and capturing it in the form of a causal loop diagram. The natural next step, 
according to the System Dynamics ‘standard method’ (Hines, 2004), is to formally model the 
described qualitative theory in a quantitative SD model, which is at the moment in 
development. 
The model being constructed in this PhD will take an aggregated point of view, looking at 
averages and sums across London, without spatial disaggregation among various regions, 
property classes, income classes of owners, or under-occupied versus overcrowded dwellings. 
Such disaggregations lie outside the scope of this project, as it will not be possible to have the 
breadth that we seek in a systemic holistic study as well as the depth implied by including such 
heterogeneities. 
The domain of the problem of housing is so vast that an abundance of potential paths for 
building on this research will present itself once it is completed. Two examples of potentially 
interesting topics for future research are (a) further exploring the interlinkages between housing 
and the economy at a macro level; such linkages are likely to be under-represented in our 
model. And (b) adapting the model resulting from this research to comparable metropolises, 
e.g. New York or Tokyo, to investigating to what extent the same underlying structure can 
replicate housing trends in those contexts 
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